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Empirical evidence from the UK market is brought to bear on recent theories of closed-end 
fund discounts. Market pricing of skill, relative to the fees charged for it, accounts for a 
significant portion of discount variation, but cannot explain the rarity of index funds or 
why they trade at a discount.  Index funds have lower discount volatility.  Discount risk is 
much more systematic on international than on domestic funds.  It is argued that even 
idiosyncratic risk is priced in closed-end funds, because they are likely to represent a 
significant proportion of investors’ risky portfolios. 
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1. Introduction 
Why do closed-end funds (CEFs) tend to trade at a discount to their net asset value per 
share (NAV)?  There is still considerable debate on this issue: to quote Shleifer (2000, 
p.53), “few problems in finance are as perplexing as [this] closed-end fund puzzle.”  The 
question raises issues of investor rationality, psychology and the efficiency of markets.  
The present paper asks whether we have come any closer to understanding the puzzle in 
the last ten years.  As well as discussing recent theories, we bring some empirical evidence 
from the U.K. closed-end fund market to bear on the question. 
 
Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999) provide a comprehensive survey of the subject up to 
the late 1990s.  Their survey covers issues such as tax treatment, liquidity, agency costs 
(including managerial ability and fees), market segmentation and the investor sentiment 
theory originally suggested by Lee et al. (1991).  They conclude that “[m]any hypotheses 
have been suggested to explain the discount, but none seem to be able to solve the closed-
end fund puzzle” (p. 35). Although they go on to suggest that research has had some partial 
success in explaining movements in discounts, the question of why prices tend to be 
significantly below net asset values on average remains unanswered. 
 
It is not our intention to go over all possible explanations in detail.  Rather we focus on two 
particular hypotheses: the investor sentiment theory and managerial skill.  Investor 
sentiment theory focuses on the fundamental feature of closed-end funds, as compared 
with open-end funds – that they carry discount risk – and argues, in line with the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), that this has to be rewarded to the extent that it is  -  3  - 
 
systematic.  The weakness of the theory is that it does a relatively poor job of explaining 
relative discounts on different funds.   
 
The idea that managerial skill (relative to the fees charged for it) can explain the discount 
has been revived, although certainly not invented, by Ross (2002).  It is an attractive idea 
because we know that demand for open-end funds is strongly related to past performance, 
so that a similar phenomenon is likely for closed-end funds.  In general, the price which 
the marginal investor is willing to pay for a fund, relative to its net assets per share, should 
reflect the perceived value of the manager’s skills; open-end funds are just a special case of 
this where the price and net asset value (NAV) are forced to be equal, so that this condition 
is met by net sales and purchases (Ferguson and Leistikow, 2001).  Managers’ perceived 
skill levels almost certainly have more time variation than fees charged, so this theory 
implies a negative correlation between some proxy for perceived skill (e.g. recent asset 
returns) and the discount.  To explain why seasoned funds tend to trade at a discount 
requires something more, however.  Recently Berk and Stanton (2007) have suggested that 
uncertain skill combined with the time profile of managerial compensation contracts 
explains closed-end fund discounts, even if investors are fully rational.  We discuss this 
theory further below.  Alternatively, investors are not fully rational and systematically 
overestimate managerial skill in newly issued funds, only recognizing this over the life of 
the fund (Ferguson and Leistikow, 2004). 
 
Thus, even if managerial skill can help to explain the cross-sectional pattern of discounts, 
it remains an open question whether it explains why the average closed-end fund trades at  -  4  - 
 
a discount, and whether the explanation is consistent with investor rationality.  The main 
contribution of this paper is that we consider what we can learn from a study of closed-end 
index funds, a few of which have existed in the UK market.  First of all, if managerial skill 
is the entire explanation for closed-end fund discounts, index funds should not trade at a 
discount, and new issues of closed-end index funds should be commonly observed 
(because they are not expected to trade at a discount in future and therefore the expected 
returns to purchasers of new issues are no lower than on an open-end index fund).  
Secondly, the managerial skill (MS) hypothesis predicts that discounts will be more 
volatile on actively managed than on index funds, where perceptions of skill cannot vary 
over time.  Thirdly, if investors overestimate the skill factor in managers’ asset returns, 
which is a possible explanation of discounts, discounts are likely to be more strongly 
mean-reverting on actively managed than on index funds, because of the mean-reversion in 
the perception of skill. 
 
Since our results suggest that the MS hypothesis cannot entirely explain the discount 
puzzle, we reconsider the investor sentiment (IS) hypothesis of Lee et al. (1991).  We find 
that the systematic component of discount risk is small on domestic closed-end funds, but 
much larger on international funds.  We consider a possible explanation for this, and we 
examine its implications for the plausibility of the IS hypothesis. 
 
2.  Closed-end Funds and the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The existence of a fund management industry violates the predictions of the basic Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with zero transactions costs and identical beliefs amongst  -  5  - 
 
investors about the probability distribution of future returns on all securities, since in this 
case the CAPM predicts that all investors would hold the market portfolio directly.  With 
transactions costs, for some investors it is prohibitively expensive to acquire the market 
portfolio.  An index fund can then charge a small fee for pooling these costs amongst a 
large number of investors, who get a slightly lower expected return, but also much less 
risk, than if they held a few securities chosen at random.  Open-end index funds of this 
kind are now common, and (particularly for those investors who have read Burton 
Malkiel’s A Random Walk Down Wall Street) may be the only risky asset held by many 
investors.  Their existence shows that the portfolio diversification benefits can exceed the 
fees charged.  In a closed-end index fund, this effect could potentially generate a premium 
(Kim and Lee, 2007).  In the debate about closed-end funds, index funds have virtually 
never been mentioned, probably because few of them exist (and none in the US market).  




3.  Managerial Skill in Actively Managed Funds 
 
Berk and Stanton (2007) provide an elegant theory in which investors rationally buy new 
issues of closed-end funds of known fixed life.  The skill of a fund’s manager is not known 
with certainty, but investor rationality ensures that expected managerial quality matches 
the fees charged over the life of the fund.  Whether, after issue, the fund trades at a 
premium or a discount depends on realized returns, which lead investors to update their 
estimates of managerial quality, and the time pattern of fees.  To explain the tendency for  -  6  - 
 
seasoned funds to trade at a discount, the authors focus on the case of a long-term contract 
where managerial fees cannot go down, but competition can force them up if realized 
returns are good.  This ratchet effect ensures a tendency for managerial fees to rise over 
time, particularly in the early years, over the life of the average fund, whilst skill is 
unchanged.  Since the balance of skill and fees is most favorable to investors in the early 
years, and least favorable later on, seasoned funds trade at a discount on average. 
 
Berk and Stanton (2007) do not cite any direct evidence that managerial compensation in 
the closed-end fund market does follow this pattern.  In the UK market, it is a well-known 
phenomenon that older funds tend to charge the lowest management fees, in direct 
contradiction of this model.  Gemmill and Thomas (2006) estimate a cross-section 
regression for the expense ratios of 186 conventional closed-end funds in the UK market 
on various fund and board characteristics.
1  Both fund age and fund size have highly 
statistically significant negative coefficients, with a doubling of fund age estimated to add 
about 10% to the expense ratio.  Although this evidence refers to a cross-section at a given 
date rather than a time series over funds’ lives, it is extremely difficult to reconcile with the 
Berk-Stanton model unless it happened to be the case that younger funds have consistently 
demonstrated superior performance. 
 
A more widely held view is that the market exaggerates the contribution of managerial 
skill in the dispersion of returns across funds and underestimates the role of luck, either 
                                                 
1 “Conventional” in this context means that the fund issues only one class of share.  -  7  - 
 
because investors fail to act rationally on the information available or because they are 
subject to biased information.  In the context of mutual fund advertising, Jain and Wu 
(2000) show that mutual funds that advertise good past performance receive more funds, 
even though they do not show superior performance in the post-advertisement period.  
Elton et al. (1989) find that new issues of publicly traded commodity funds produce 
returns far below the very high rates advertised in the prospectus.  Ferguson and Leistikow 
(2004) argue that a similar phenomenon applies to initial public offerings of new closed-
end funds: a manager with unusually good recent performance is selected, whose apparent 
skill outweighs the fees charged.  Because in fact much, if not all, of the good performance 
advertised is a matter of luck rather than skill, investors subsequently revise downwards 
their estimate of the manager’s skill, and for this reason seasoned funds tend to fall to a 
discount.
2   
 
It is difficult to test these explanations of the closed-end fund discount empirically.  If the 
MS hypothesis is true, however, in a cross-section of funds those with better past 
performance should be on lower discounts.  In Table 1 we provide evidence on this for a 
sample of 66 UK funds in sectors populated by a good number of funds.
3  The dependent 
variable is the discount (NAV minus price divided by NAV) at 31 December 2005.  The 
independent variables are the seven-year NAV return on the fund and a set of sector 
                                                 
2 According to this theory, a fund run by a manager with exceptional skill would not be expected to fall to 
the same discount as other funds, so the high perceived skill of the manager encourages investors to believe 
that there will not be much of a capital loss from buying an initial public offering at a premium. 
3 The sectors are UK Growth, UK Growth and Income, UK Smaller Companies and Global Growth, as 
defined by the Association of Investment Companies (AIC).  The funds are listed in Appendix 3.  -  8  - 
 
dummies (funds in the UK Smaller Companies sector tend to have higher discounts). The 
first column of Table 1 shows that good past returns significantly reduce the discount.  An 
extra one per cent of annual average NAV returns was associated with about a 0.4 per cent 
(= 7 x 6.10 x 0.01) reduction in the discount.  Studies of open-end funds have found 
significant non-linearities in the relationship between past performance and net inflows, 
with stronger effects at the higher end (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 
1998).  Non-linearities are investigated in columns (2) and (3).  In column (2) the square of 
past returns is positive and significant, suggesting a stronger effect for good than for bad 
returns, as for open-end funds. The third column shows that the performance effect appears 
to be confined to the top quartile of sector performance. 
 
 
These results strongly suggest that perceived managerial skill affects the discount, but they 
are not sufficient to show that MS explains discounts in general.  To obtain some further 
insight into this, we now turn to index funds.  -  9  - 
 
Table 1.  Discounts and Long-Term NAV Returns on UK Funds 
  Dependent variable: Discount (%) at 31 December 2005 
Independent variables  (1) (2) (3) 














Square of 7-yr NAV 
returns 
 − 8 . 7 9  
(−2.23) 
 
7-yr NAV returns * 
upper quartile dummy 
    −7.19 
(−3.62) 
























Sample size  66  66  66 
R-squared  0.370  0.418  0.483 
Standard error  4.69  4.54  4.28 
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  Discount = 100*[1–(price/NAV)].  Seven-year NAV returns 
are calculated as ln (total return index at 31.12.05 ÷ total return index at 31.12.98).  Upper quartile dummy = 
1 if fund is in upper quartile of sector for seven-year NAV returns, =0 otherwise.  See Appendix 3 for funds 




4. Index  Funds 
Although index funds have become increasingly popular in the UK open-end fund market, 
as in the US, the striking feature is that closed-end index funds (as distinct from exchange 
traded funds, which undertake to create and liquidate shares actively to keep prices very 
close to net asset value) are rare.  None exist in the US and there have only ever been a few 
(currently two) in the UK.  Of these, the Edinburgh UK Tracker Trust tracks the FTSE All-
Share Index, as did the now defunct Tribune Index Trust.  The Edinburgh US Tracker 
Fund tracks the S&P 500 Index of US stocks.  The Edinburgh UK Smaller Companies  -  10  - 
 
Trust tracked the FTSE Smaller Companies Index (the lowest 10% of the market by value) 
until its liquidation in 2006. 
 
A feature of these funds is that with one exception none of them was an index fund at first 
issue.  The first to be available was the Edinburgh UK Tracker Trust, which came about in 
1990 as a result of the reorganisation of the poorly performing Globe Investment Trust.  
Tribune Index Trust originated in 1997 as an index option for the actively managed 
Tribune Trust, with investors having the right to convert between the two portfolios on a 
specified date each year.  Because the actively managed portfolio performed poorly, 
conversions favoured the index portfolio, and in 2006 the actively managed portfolio was 
liquidated.  The index fund was itself liquidated in 2007.  The Edinburgh US Tracker Trust 
evolved out of the actively managed American Investment Trust in 1993, also following a 
period of poor performance.  Only the Edinburgh UK Smaller Companies Trust was a new 
issue (in 1993), and was liquidated in 2007.  It had no open-end counterpart, perhaps 
because the shares in the index sometimes lack liquidity, which suggests that this is a case 
where the advantages of the closed-end structure outweigh the disincentive to invest in a 
new closed-end index fund. 
 
By definition index funds do not claim to possess managerial skill, and no investor could 
sensibly believe otherwise.  If managerial skill explains the closed-end fund discount 
puzzle, index funds should therefore trade on lower discounts than actively managed 
funds, and if it is the entire explanation, then index funds should not trade at a significant 
discount at all.  One would think that a closed-end structure is particularly suitable for  -  11  - 
 
index funds, because an open-end structure requires considerable number of transactions 
when there are significant net inflows or outflows, if tracking error is to be minimized. In 
principle, therefore, in a competitive market fees on a closed-end index fund could be less 
than on an open-end index fund.  The extreme rarity of new issues of closed-end index 
funds thus suggests an expectation amongst potential investors that they are likely to trade 
at a discount in the future, so that buyers at inception would face a capital loss that could 
be avoided by holding an exchange-trade fund or open-end index fund. 
 
We now provide some evidence relating to quarterly observations on discounts on index 
funds and comparable actively managed funds in the UK market from the end of 1997 to 
the end of 2007.  There are two index funds (Edinburgh UK Tracker Trust and Edinburgh 
US Tracker Trust) and ten large actively managed funds, nine that specialize in UK stocks 
and one in North American stocks.  Table 2 shows the mean premium, the t-statistic for a 
test that the mean premium is negative, the standard deviation of the change in and of the 
level of the premium, the premium range and the estimated mean-reversion coefficient of 
the premium.  The bottom two rows of Table 2 relate to a test for significant differences in 
each of these statistics between index funds and actively managed funds.
4 
 
Both index and actively managed funds tend to trade at a discount, although the discount 
tends to be lower (although not statistically significantly so) for index funds. Mean-
reversion is also slower for index funds, although again the difference is not statistically 
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significant.  There is, however, a statistically significant difference in discount volatility, 
with actively managed funds having greater volatility.  The MS hypothesis predicts the 


























Index        
EUK 1.62 2.83 2.34 3.66 12.6 -0.19 
EUS 4.22 9.34 2.06 2.89 13.1 -0.25 
Active        
COL 4.85 6.59 2.72 4.71 19.1 -0.17 
DUN  11.47  17.4 4.73 4.22 29.9 -0.61 
ED 13.67  27.4 3.01 3.19 14.6 -0.52 
CLA 1.20 1.89 2.81 4.05 18.0 -0.26 
MER  6.36 8.99 4.40 4.53 17.5 -0.46 
MUR  10.31  19.7 3.00 3.36 12.5 -0.39 
PIG 6.55 8.12 2.80 5.17 20.8 -0.17 
SIG 6.23 7.16 3.59 5.57 21.6 -0.22 
TB  3.09 4.39 4.31 4.51 18.7 -0.47 
AM 7.99 11.1 3.06 4.62 20.4 -0.21 
       
Difference*  4.25 5.19 1.24 1.12 6.46 -0.13 
(t-statistic) (1.50)  (0.88)  (2.22)  (2.01)  (1.89)  (-1.08) 
Notes.  *Active minus index. The funds are: Edinburgh UK Tracker Trust, Edinburgh US Tracker Trust, City 
of London Investment Trust, Dunedin Income Growth Investment Trust, Edinburgh Investment Trust, 
JPMorgan Claverhouse Investment Trust, Mercantile Trust, Murray Income Trust, Perpetual Income & 
Growth Trust, Schroder Income Growth Fund, and JPMorgan American Investment Trust. 
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We may also compare discount levels and volatility on the managed and index portfolios 
run in parallel for some years by Tribune Trust.  The seven-year performance of the 
managed portfolio was ranked 21
st out of 23 surviving funds in the Global Growth sector at 
the end of 2005.
5  According to our theory, this should be taken as evidence of low skill, 
which would raise the discount.  Table 3 provides some analysis of 29 quarterly 
observations on the percentage discount of the two portfolios from 31
st December 1998 to 
31
st December 2005.  The managed portfolio had both a significantly higher average 
discount (10.6% compared with 6.8%) and significantly higher discount volatility, as 
measured by absolute quarterly discount movements (3.21% compared with 1.81%).  The 
higher volatility of the managed portfolio is consistent with the evidence in Table 2, and 
the relatively high average discount is also what we would expect for a managed fund 
experiencing poor returns. 
 
Table 3. Discounts on Indexed and Managed Portfolios of Tribune Trust 
 
 Dependent  variable 
  Discount (%)  Absolute Quarterly Change 











Sample size  29  28 
R-squared 0.353  0.071 
Standard error  2.73  2.58 
Notes.  Sample: quarterly observations 31.12.98 to 31.12.05. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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5.  The Investor Sentiment Theory 
The evidence provided above suggests that perceived managerial skill is an element of 
closed-end fund discounts, but that it is not the whole story.  Past returns help to explain 
the cross-sectional pattern of discounts, and discounts are more volatile on actively 
managed than on index funds.  There is also some evidence that discounts are on average 
higher on actively managed funds.  Nevertheless index funds also trade at a discount, and 
new issues of index funds have occurred only with extreme rarity, despite the attractions of 
a closed-end structure, which suggests that investors have good reasons for not buying 
them.  The MS hypothesis cannot explain these phenomena. 
 
The only difference between a closed-end index fund and an open-end index fund charging 
identical fees is the discount risk.  Investors can be rewarded for accepting discount risk if 
there is a discount in equilibrium, because they pay less for the same income flow.   An 
equilibrium discount means, however, that investors will only buy new funds, which sell at 
a premium to cover marketing expenses, in special circumstances (e.g. where the asset 
class or the manager is perceived as “hot”) that cannot apply to index funds.  Thus the 
absence of new issues of index funds may reasonably be interpreted as additional evidence 
that, if they existed, they would tend to trade at a discount. 
 
Let us return, then, to the investor sentiment theory of Lee et al. (1991).  Their argument is 
that discount risk is to a significant degree systematic, and therefore has to be rewarded 
according to the CAPM, which is achieved through the mechanism mentioned above, i.e. 
by funds trading at a discount in equilibrium.  Although Lee et al. (1991) offer  -  15  - 
 
considerable evidence for their theory (which has been challenged in some quarters), they 
fail to implement the most straightforward test of their proposition, which is to investigate 
whether the market beta on a closed-end fund’s shares is significantly greater than on its 
underlying assets. 
 
In Table 4 we provide some evidence on this issue for a panel of monthly data for sixty 
funds traded in the United Kingdom from 1980 to 2001.  The sample is divided into funds 
specializing in domestic equities (23) and those specializing in international equities (37). 
For international equities the index used is the Datastream World Market Index (UK£).  
Although the beta on the funds’ prices is higher than on their assets in both cases, the 
difference is really only quantitatively significant for international funds.  Thus it is far 
from clear that discount risk is universally systematic. 
 
 
Table 4.  Market Betas on UK Closed-end Fund NAVs and Prices 
 
 Dependent  Variable 






 Coefficient  (t-statistic) of Index Returns 












Notes. The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Betas are estimated from the regression R = α + 
βM + u, where R is the one-month excess return on the closed-end fund relative to the one-month eurodeposit 
rate, and M is the one-month excess return on the stock market index relative to the eurodeposit rate.  The 
stock market index is the Datastream UK Market Index for domestic funds, and the Data Stream World 
Market Index (in sterling) for international funds. The sample of funds used is listed in Appendices 1 and 2. 
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Is it reasonable, however, to appeal to a version of the CAPM that assumes no transactions 
costs when analyzing the pricing of collective investment funds, which would not exist in 
such a world?  With transactions costs, small investors would own relatively few equity 
investments (individual stocks or stock mutual funds), each of which would represent a 
significant portion of their risky portfolio. Kim and Lee (2007, p. 383, footnote 3) quote a 
2002 study that shows that US equity investors owned on average a median of four equity 
investments.  In that situation, the CAPM prediction that only covariance affects portfolio 
risk, and that the variance of returns on individual assets does not do so, is not valid, 
because it depends on individual assets each representing a negligible proportion of the 
total portfolio.  In a world where few risky assets are held, discount risk is going to add to 
the riskiness of the portfolio of the typical holder, even if it is uncorrelated with returns to 
the underlying assets.  To put it another way, the excess volatility of closed-end fund 
shares (i.e. higher volatility of returns to shareholders than on the underlying assets) is 
more relevant than having “excess beta”.  For closed-end fund shares not to have excess 




A secondary question is why international funds, many of which in our sample are quite 
geographically specialized, display much stronger evidence of excess beta than domestic 
funds. Most probably this is a case of neglected stocks in the sense of Merton (1987).  
More specialized funds are held by relatively few investors except when this class of assets 
                                                 
6 See Pontiff (1997) for evidence that closed-end funds in the US market are also characterized by excess 
volatility.  -  17  - 
 
hits the headlines with spectacular returns (as was the case for emerging markets in the 
mid-1990s or commercial property in 2006-07), which draw in investors that would not 
normally hold them and drives them to a premium. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have reviewed recent work on closed-end fund discounts in light of evidence from the 
UK market.  In particular, we have argued that more attention should be paid to index 
funds, for which investors cannot be claimed to misestimate managerial skill.  Index funds 
tend to trade at a significant discount, and this probably accounts for their rarity, since it 
discourages new issues.  There is considerable evidence that perceived managerial skill 
affects discounts on actively managed funds, both from the cross-sectional pattern of 
discounts and from the tendency for discounts to be more volatile on actively managed 
than on index funds.  It is less clear that managerial skill accounts for the general tendency 
for funds to trade at a discount.  Management fees are significantly lower on older funds, 
in direct contradiction of the assumptions in Berk and Stanton’s (2007) model, which 
combines uncertain managerial skill with rational investors.  In particular the managerial 
skill hypothesis cannot explain why index funds also typically trade at a discount. 
 
We have implemented a simple test of Lee et al.’s (1991) hypothesis that closed-end funds 
trade at a discount because discount risk is to some extent systematic.  Our results suggest 
that, although closed-end fund shares display excess return volatility relative to their 
underlying assets, discount risk is mostly idiosyncratic, with the systematic element mainly 
confined to more specialized funds.  The investor sentiment explanation of discounts of  -  18  - 
 
Lee et al. (1991) is that they exist because an investor who holds closed-end funds carries 
greater portfolio risk than one who holds open-end funds.  We have argued that this can be 
true even if discount risk is purely idiosyncratic, because, in a world with transactions 
costs, investors only hold a small number of risky assets, each of which represents a 
significant proportion of the portfolio.  In such a world, it is the excess volatility of closed-
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Appendix Table 1: U.K. Domestic Equity Funds in Table 4 sample 
 
GENERAL EQUITY    EQUITY INCOME 
GROWTH 
 
3i UK Select  1981.12-2001.8  City of London  1980.1-2001.8 
Albany 1980.1-2001.8  Dunedin  Income 
Growth 
1980.1-2001.8 
Edinburgh  1980.1-2001.8 Lowland 1980.1-2001.8 
Finsbury  Growth  1980.1-2001.8 Merchants 1980.1-2001.8 
Finsbury  1981.3-2001.8 Murray  Income 1980.1-2001.8 
Fleming Claverhouse  1980.1-2001.7  Securities Trust of 
Scotland 
1980.1-2001.8 
Govett Strategic  1980.1-2001.8  Temple Bar   1980.1-2001.8 
    Value and Income  1981.7-2001.8 
    
SMALL COMPANIES     
3i Quoted Smaller 
Companies 
1980.1-2001.8    
Dresdner RCM 
Smaller Companies 
1980.1-2001.8    
Dunedin Smaller 
Companies 
1980.1-2001.8    
Gartmore Smaller 
Companies 
1980.1-2001.8    
Henderson Smaller 
Companies 
1980.1-2001.8    
INVESCO English  1980.1-2001.8     
Perpetual UK 
Smaller Companies 
1988.2-2001.8    
Throgmorton 1980.1-2001.8     
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Appendix Table 2: U.K. International Equity Funds in Table 4 sample 
 
  Sample Range     





1992.12-2001.12  TR European Growth 1990.7-2001.12 
North Atlantic Small 
Companies 















1994.2-2001.12 Templeton  Emerging 
Markets 
1989.6-2001.12 
F&C Latin America  1990.7-2001.12  Baillie Giff. Japan  1985.1-2001.12 
Aberdeen New Thai  1989.12-2001.12  Baillie Shin Nippon  1985.7-2001.12 
Fleming Indian  1994.3-2001.12  Fidelity Japanese 
Values 
1994.2-2001.12 
Gartmore Irish  1995.5-2001.7  Fleming Japanese  1985.1-2001.12 
Old Mutual South 
African 
1994.6-2001.7 Perpetual  Japan  1993.6-2001.12 
Aberdeen New Dawn  1989.5-2001.12  Schroder Japan  1994.5-2001.12 
Edinburgh Dragon  1987.9-2001.12  Charter European  1985.1-2001.8 
Henderson Far East  1985.1-2001.12  Fleming Continental 
Europe 
1985.1-2001.8 
Pacific Assets  1985.1-2001.12  F&C Eurotrust  1985.1-2001.8 
Pacific Horizon  1989.9-2001.12  Gartmore European  1985.1-2001.8 
Fidelity European 
Values 
1991.10-2001.12 Perpetual  European  1989.11-2001.8 
Martin Currie Europe  1990.2-2001.12  European Assets  1985.1-2001.8 
Merrill Lynch 
European 
1994.2-2001.12    
   -  22  - 
 
Appendix Table 3 – Funds used in Table 1 regressions, by sector 
 
UK Growth (13) 
Albany, Aurora, Edinburgh, Fidelity Special Values, Hansa, ISIS UK Select, JPM 
Claverhouse, JPM Mercantile, JPM Midcap, Keystone, Manchester and London, Schroder 
UK Growth, UK Select. 
 
UK Growth and Income (14) 
British and American, City of London, Dunedin Income, F&C Capitla and Income, 
Finsbury Growth and Income, INVESCO Income Growth, Lowland, Merchant, Murray 
Income, Perpetual Income and Growth, Schroder Income Growth, Securities Trust of 
Scotland, Standard Life Equity Income, Temple Bar. 
 
UK Smaller Companies (18) 
Aberforth, Dunedin Smaller Companies, Eaglet, Edinburgh Small Companies, Framlington 
Innovative Growth, Gartmore Fledgling, Gartmore Growth Opportunities, Gartmore 
Smaller Companies, Henderson Smaller Companies, Henderson Strata, INVESCO English 
and International, INVESCO Perpetual UK Smaller Companies, ISIS Smaller Companies, 
JPM Smaller Companies, Merrill Lynch British Smaller Companies, Montanaro, Platinum, 
Throgmorton. 
 
Global Growth (21) 
Advance UK, Alliance, Bankers, British Empire Securities and General, Brunner, Electric 
and General, Establishment, Foreign and Colonial, Gartmore Global, INVESCO City and 
Commercial, Jupiter Primadona, London and St Lawrence, Majedie, Martin Currie 
Portfolio, Personal Assets, RIT Capital Partners, SVM Global, Scottish, Scottish 
Mortgage, Second Alliance, Witan.  
 